511 
T45 
opy 2 


RUSSIAN- DIPLOMACY 
AND -THE- WAR 


BY • JAMES • WESTrALL - THOMPSON * 
PROFESSOR • OF - EUROPEAN • HISTORY 
IN • THE • UNIVERSITY • OE-CHICAGO* 
PUBLISHED • UNDER • THE • AUSPICES 
OE • THE • GERMANISTIC • SOCIETY 
OE • CHICAGO *. 


Number Eleven 


% 

* 


















. 














eurt 

Society 

JUL £3 1SU 









FOREWORD 

The Germanistic Society plans to issue a series 
of pamphlets to appear from time to time, dealing 
with the war in Europe and its underlying causes. 
The Society has solicited contributions from various 
writers and historians. The pamphlets are to serve 
the cause of truth, to correct misrepresentations, and 
to exemplify the spirit of objectivity and fair play. 

Former publications: 

No. 1—Germany and the Peace of Europe 
by Prof. Ferdinand Schevill. 

No. 2—The Causes of the European Conflict 
by Prof. John W. Burgess. 

No. 3—How Germany was forced into war 
by Raymond E. Swing. 

No. A —The Session of the German Reichstag 
by Prof. Alex. R Hohlfeld. 

No. 5—Germany’s fateful hour 

by Prof. Kuno Francke. 

No. 6—German Atrocities and International Law 
by Prof. James G. McDonald. 

No. 7 —“Militarism” and “The Emperor,” the latter 
by Prof. John W. Burgess. 

No. 8—The Evolution of the German Empire 
by Prof. Geo. L. Scherger. 

No. 9—German Resources and the War 
by His Excellency Dr. Dernburg. 

No. 10—Germany and England, the Real Issue 
by His Excellency Dr. Dernburg. 

Copies of these pamphlets are for sale at the 
office of the Society at the following prices: 


Single copies.$ 0.05 

10 copies. 0.25 

100 copies.. 1.50 


1000 COpieS (f. o. b. Chicago) . ; . . 10.00 
Profits, if any, will be turned over to the Society 
of the Red Cross. 

THE GERMANISTIC SOCIETY 

OF CHICAGO. 

Louis Guenzel, Recording Secretary 
332 So. Michigan Ave., Chicago, Ill. 






Russian Diplomacy and the War 

By 

JAMES WESTFALL THOMPSON 

Author of: The Wars of Religion in France, 

The Frankfort Book Fair, etc. 


In the history of thought the present year will always be memora¬ 
ble for the degree in which national public opinion has been recognized 
as a political factor. The spectacle of the great powers of Europe 
circularizing the world with reprints of their diplomatic correspondence 
on the eve of the great war, in order to convert the mind of neutral 
nations, is as novel as it is interesting. The aggregate documents— 
the British White Book, the German White Book, the Russian Orange 
Book, the Belgian Grey Book, the French Yellow Book, make a body 
of material as parti-colored as Joseph’s coat. 

In volume, if not in weight, the exhibit of the Allies is very 
large. There are 159 documents in the British White Book; 27 in 
the German White Book; 79 in the Russian Orange Book; 49 in the 
Belgian Grey Book; 157 in the French Yellow Book, with many 
“annexes.” The allied governments show a clever perception of the 
workings of popular psychology in the broad campaign of publicity 
they have initiated. They may be sure that most of the thousands of 
copies of their diplomatic correspondence which have been distributed 
will not—can not be—read critically. But they calculate that the dead 
weight of the mass will be impressive and that this result is in itself 
worth while. 

The reader of judgment and discrimination, however, will not 
be deceived by this new method of publicity. This campaign to carry 
the heights of intelligence is one of apparent, not real publicity. The 
man who thinks knows—if he knows aught of the practice of modern 
governments—that they are one and all jealous of preserving the se¬ 
crecy of their archives. In England departmental papers in the Record 
Office are open to public examination down to 1837 [to 1850 in the 
case of the War Office]. The papers of the Foreign Office are most 
tightly sealed of all, so that 1810 is the latest practical date of in¬ 
vestigation. In France until recently it required an authorization of 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs to give the student access to any 
diplomatic^correspondence later than 1791. In the case of documents 
between 1791 and May 30, 1814, all notes and extracts had to be sub- 


— 4 — 


mitted to the chief of the division who decided, subject to appeal to 
the minister, what might be published. All diplomatic correspondence 
later than May 30, 1814, was closed to general examination and access 
was procurable only as a special privilege which was rarely granted. 
Less than three years ago this restriction was removed with reference 
to diplomatic correspondence before February 24, 1848. In Austria- 
Hungary the Haus-und-Hof-und Staatsarchiv is open, with excep¬ 
tions, to 1847, but not beyond. 

Consequently the careful reader of these compends should be on 
his guard. Diplomatic language is traditionally cryptic. The words used 
have often unfamiliar shades of meaning; allusions are so covert as to 
be almost undiscernible to the lay mind; broad—and apparently soft 
—and always courteous phraseology may conceal a bitter sting. It 
is often necessary, so to speak, to read between the lines of a diplo¬ 
matic document in order to understand it. The language, while super¬ 
ficially direct, is usually evasive and framed to darken counsel. Im¬ 
portant points are sometimes passed over in silence, so that to the 
alert reader omissions may be more important than what is said. 
Finally it must always be remembered, in studying such documents, 
that it is impossible to control them by other documents which are 
withheld from publication because they are too intimate or would 
reveal too much. It must be borne in mind that the published docu¬ 
ments have been selected with the express purpose of making out a 
“case.” The sneer of England’s Illuminati —those eminent scholars of 
Oxford, Cambridge and other ancient seats of learning, that the 
“German White Book contains only some scanty and carefully ex¬ 
plained selections from the diplomatic correspondence which preceded 
the war” may be directed with equal veracity at the British White Book, 
and shows that opinions are not always carefully weighed even bv 
wise men. There are obvious lacunae in the official correspondence 
of the powers in the Entente Cordiale. The sequence of the letters 
is not always perfect, for some links have been left out of the chain. 
Sometimes the evidence admitted has been strained out of its natural 
relation and given forced application elsewhere. Sometimes the evi¬ 
dence is glossed. Sometimes the natural nexus of facts is ignored 
and an arbitrary relation of facts, calculated to deceive, substituted. 

The British White Book affords several examples of this kind of 
“editing.” In order to show that Germany began mobilization as early 
as July 23 [the day of the Austrian note to Servia] the compiler 
arbitrarily construed the date of one document as July 23, but for¬ 
got to change the day of the week at the same time, which is desig¬ 
nated as Saturday, whereas July 23 was a Thursday. The “mistake” 
was discovered later and “explained” in the subsequent edition. In 
No. 105, we find Sir Edward Grey writing to Sir Francis Bertie on 
Thursday, July 30: 

“M. Cambon reminded me today of the letter I had written him 

two years ago.He gave me a paper of which a copy is 

also enclosed, showing that the German military preparations were 
more advanced and more on the offensive upon the frontier than 
anything France had yet done.” 

— 5 — 


The difficulty of reconciling the statement of this enclosure from 
Cambon with a letter written by Sir Edward Grey on the day afterward 
[ July 311 in which he merely expressed “prospect of mobilization in 
Germany’’ [No. 114] was so great that the British government, in a 
“revised” number of the White Book, cut out the tell-tale date [ yester- 
day”=Friday] in Cambon’s paper, as a result of which editing this 
very important document is now published without any date at all 
attached to it [No. 105, enclosure 3]—a most singular omission in a 
state document. 

As a matter of fact the Cambon enclosure could not possibly have 
been written on July 30, or even on July 31. Germany’s mobilization 
was not ordered until 5 P. M. on August 1, and as late as July 31 we 
find Grey regarding Germany’s mobilization as no more than, a pros¬ 
pective possibility. Cambon’s enclosure must have been written on 
August 2 or later, and the effort of the editorial note to make out that 
the Saturday alluded to is July 25, the date of Servia’s reply to 
Austria, is transparent artifice. The real document sent by Cambon 
has been suppressed apparently and another “enclosure” substituted. 

The baldest example, however, of this tampering is contained in 
the French Yellow Book, No. 5, which purports to be a “Report on 
German public opinion according to diplomatic and consular agents,” 
made to the French minister of foreign affairs on July 30, 1913. The 
reference is to the “coup d’Agadir” in July 1911. “If the Emperor 
was discussed,” it runs, “and the Chancellor unpopular, Herr Von 
Kiderlen was the most hated man in Germany last winter. Neverthe¬ 
less he is beginning to be less badly thought of, for he has let it be 
understood that he would take his revenge.” The absurdity and false 
representation in this “report” is manifest when it is known that Von 
Kiderlen died in December, 1912 —seven months before the time he is 
supposed to be “beginning to be less badly thought of”! 

The French Yellow Book, in particular, must be read with ex T 
cessive care, partly because psychological analysis of the ante-bellum 
situation fills a large portion of it, and a subjective interpretation of 
history must always be read with great caution; partly because some 
of the documents in the Yellow Book look singularly suspicious, nota¬ 
bly the one in the introduction purporting to be “an official and 
secret report apparently drawn up by a German officer of high rank, 
upon the strengthening of the German Army.” This alleged report is 
said to be “from a sure source” and to have been delivered to the French 
government on April 2, 1913. All this looks very dubious. Until 
the archives are unsealed no careful historian can give credence to 
alleged “reports” procured by spies. On the face of it the “report” 
has the appearance of having been fabricated in the French foreign 
office, or in the ministry of war for a purpose. 

The immediate purpose of this paper is to endeavor, on the basis 
of the fundamental documents, to fix the responsibility for beginning 
the war. I believe, when the fires of the present conflagration have 
died down and scientific historical scholarship has been permitted to 
investigate the now hidden archives covering the history of recent 

— 6 — 


years, that the sober judgment of history will fix the blame of this war 
upon the diplomacy of Russia. 

The documents for the first four days—July 20 to 24—when the 
war-cloud was beginning to gather over Europe, are relatively meager. 
The British White Book has 12; the Russian Orange Book 9; the 
French Yellow Book 34; the Belgian Grey Book 2; the German White 
Book 4. During these four tense days the question of Servia was of 
paramount interest. But the key to the situation is to be found, not 
in Belgrade, but in St. Petersburg. It is instructive, at this time, to 
analyze the mind of Sazonov, the Russian Minister of Foreign Af¬ 
fairs, as his thought is unveiled in the dispatches. The policy of Russia 
may be summed up in two alternative propositions, either of which 
was prejudicial to Austria: [1] War with Austria if Austria was 
determined to force Servia to refrain from anti-Austrian propaganda. 
[2] No war only if Austria permitted the Servian wound to remain 
open. At all cost, including war, was a settlement of the Servian 
question to be prevented by Russia. 

Yet for Austria the Servian situation had become intolerable, as it 
would have been to any other state. Longer waiting was impossible. 
She felt that a conference would merely fritter away time, adjourn 
the issue and settle nothing. Austria’s pledge to regard the integrity 
of Servian territory shows that she only planned a punitive expedition 
against Servia; that the course was a defensive one. The Servian 
propaganda against her had become a menace too dangerous to permit 
to go on. But Russia was resolved to interfere in spite of the fact that 
Austria promised to respect the independence and the territorial in¬ 
tegrity of Servia, and that every government in Europe recognized 
the just nature of Austria’s essential grievance against Servia. The 
•continued impotence of Austria before Servia was the only price of 
peace with Russia. This is clear from the words of Sazonov to the 
Imperial German Ambassador in St. Petersburg on July 24 that “Russia 
could not permit the Servo-Austrian difficulty to be settled alone be¬ 
tween the parties concerned under any circumstances.” [German 
White Book No. 4.] 

Confirmation of this warlike attitude of Russia is found in a 
dispatch of the same day by Sir George Buchanan, the British Am¬ 
bassador in St. Petersburg, to his government, recording a conversa¬ 
tion with Sazonov. In this the latter, in reply to a direct question 
from Buchanan asking whether it was the intention of the Russian 
government to declare war on Austria in event of Austria using 
military measures against Servia, said: “That he, himself, thought 
that Russian mobilization would at any rate have to be carried out” 
[British White Book No. 6]. This is an immensely important admis¬ 
sion as it shows that partial mobilization had already begun before this 
date. Yet Russia has claimed that no mobilization order was issued be¬ 
fore July 29; that the order of July 25 calling men, not then part of the 
regular army, to the colors was not “technically” mobilization. Sa- 
zonov’s own statement, which the editor of the British White Book 
indiscreetly let slip into print, taken in connection with the fact that 
later military developments proved that thousands of Russian troops 

— 7 — 


had this early been moved westward, refutes Russia’s claim of pacific 
intentions. 

The balance of this dispatch of Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey 
rivets the reader’s mind to the conclusion that Russia was bent on 
war. Sazonov eagerly urged upon Buchanan the hope “that His 
Majesty’s Government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with 
Russia and France.’’ He waived aside Buchanan’s suggestion “that 
it seemed to me desirable that we should know just how far Servia 
was prepared to go to meet the demand formulated by Austria.” Not 
Russian mobilization must be carried out. The Russian Foreign Min¬ 
ister was determined to force a local issue into the forefront on the 
ground that: “The general European question was involved, the 
Servian question being but a part of the former.” 

Further evidence on this head, i. e., that Russia would refrain 
from making war on Austria only on condition that Austria let Servia 
alone to continue to work injury to her, is to be found in the British 
White Book, No. 17. On July 25 Buchanan expressed to Sazonov 
“the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war by mobilizing” 
Buchanan, as well as Sazonov, evidently felt that mobilization meant 
war. “His Excellency assured me,” continues Buchanan, “that Rus¬ 
sia had no aggressive intentions, and she would take no action until 
it was forced on her. Austria’s action was in reality directed against 
Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present status quo in the 
Balkans and establishing her own hegemony there. He did not believe 
that Germany really wanted zvar , but her attitude was decided by 
ours. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would 
be no war. If we failed them now rivers of blood would flow, and 

we would in the end be dragged into war. 

. . . . “I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister 

for Foreign Affairs, and warned him that if Russia mobilized Germany 
zvould not be content zvith mere mobilization or give Russia time to 
carry out hers, but would probably declare zvar at once. His Excel¬ 
lency replied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush Servia and 
become the predominant power in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure 
of the support of France, she zvill face all the risks of zvar.” [British 
White Book, No. 17.] 

This clearly shows that Russia’s policy was to prevent any set¬ 
tlement of the Servian difficulty. Servia was to be kept open as a 
running sore in Austria’s side. 

In the light of his own cynical conduct, Sazonov’s statement to 
Buchanan “that Austria’s conduct was both provocative and immoral”' 
[British White Book, No. 6], exhibits a singular standard of ethics. 
The greater pity is that Sazonov’s cunning also threatened to in¬ 
volve France [and ultimately did so] in a war which was really 
of Russia’s own choosing and of Russia’s own making. “The French 
Ambassador,” continues Buchanan in this tremendously important 
dispatch, “gave me to understand that France would fulfil all the 
obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia. ... It seems to me,, 
from the language held by the French Ambassador, that even if we 
[Great Britain] decline to join them, France and Russia are determined 
to make a strong stand.” Confident of French support and certain of 

— 8 — 



I 


his ability to cajole or impress England into war, Sazonov aggres¬ 
sively pushed his policy. 

Meanwhile Sir Edward Grey, of whom the British Premier said in 
his Guildhall speech that “no man in the history of the world has ever 
labored more strenuously or more successfully for that which is the 
supreme interest of the modern world—a general and abiding peace,” 
was actually so asleep at his post that on the very day of this mo¬ 
mentous interview he wrote Sir Francis Bertie, British Ambassador 
in Paris, that he “had not contemplated anything being said in St. 
Petersburg until after it was clear that there must be trouble between 
Austria and Russia” [British White Book, No. 10]. Not until nearly 
a week later—July 30, to be exact—did Sir Edward Grey waken to 
the fact that he was being hoodwinked by Russia, whereupon, in a 
panic, he vainly tried to bring pressure upon Russia through France, 
and wired Sir Francis Bertie: “Inform the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs .... that I know that he has been urging Russia not to pre¬ 
cipitate a crisis .” [British White Book, No. 104.] Wiser than his chief 
and left without clear instructions from Downing Street to restrain the 
Russian government from taking aggressive military measures, Buch¬ 
anan on July 27 had warned Sazonov that: “His Excellency must 
not, if our efforts were to be successful, do anything to precipitate a 
conflict. In these circumstances I trusted that the Russian Govern¬ 
ment would defer the mobilization ukase for as long as possible and 
that troops would not be allowed to cross the frontier even when it 
was issued.” [British White Book, No. 44.] 

Germany, in the meantime, was alert to the peril impending from 
the east, and through Sir Edward Goschen, the British Ambassador in 
Berlin, sought to bring England into alignment with her own efforts 
for peace. On July 27, in a conversation with Goschen, the Imperial 
Secretary of State, von Jagow, warned the British Government that 
Russia’s inflexible policy of hostility might defeat every effort toward 
peace, since “news he had just received from St. Petersburg showed 
that there was no intention on the part of M. de Sazonov to exchange 
views with Count Berchtold,” and he added, Goschen reports: “That 
as yet Austria was only partially mobilizing, but that if Russia mobil¬ 
ized against Germany latter would have to follow suit. I asked 
him what he meant by ‘mobilizing against Germany.’ He said that 
if Russia only mobilized in south, Germany would not mobilize, but 
if she mobilized in north, Germany would have to do so too, and Rus¬ 
sian system of mobilization was so complicated that it might be dif¬ 
ficult exactly to locate her mobilization. Germany would, therefore, 
have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise.” [British White 
Book, No. 43.] 

The next day, July 28, the Imperial Chancellor, in weighty word^ 
emphasized the same danger likely to arise from Russian mobilization- 
“If the news were true which he had just read in the papers, that 
Russia had mobilized fourteen army corps in the south, he thought 
situation was very serious, and he himself would be in a very difficult 
position, as in these circumstances it would be out of his power to 
continue to preach moderation at Vienna. He added that Austria, 
who as yet was only partially mobilizing, would have to take similar 

— 9 — 


measures, and if war were the result, Russia would be entirely responsi¬ 
ble” [British White Book, No. 71.] 

Germany did everything humanly possible in these tense days to 
localize the war [British White Book, Nos. 46, 67, 68]. No un¬ 
prejudiced person can doubt that the Kaiser was back of the German 
move which induced Austria to give some kind of guarantee for the 
integrity of Servia. The German Secretary for Foreign Affairs ex¬ 
plicitly told Sir Edward Goschen that “Austria’s readiness to discuss 
was the result of German influence at Vienna” [British White Book, 
No. 138]. The testimony of the Belgian charge d’affaires in St. Peters¬ 
burg, M. De L’Escaille—a witness whom the Allies will hardly im¬ 
peach—is to the same effect. On July 30 he wrote as follows to his 
government in Brussels: 

“It is indisputable that Germany has taken pains at St. Peters¬ 
burg and Vienna to find a way of avoiding a general conflict.” 

Then, after stating that Russia was mobilizing her whole army, 
he added the significant words: 

“Today St. Petersburg is firmly convinced, nay, it has even 
received assurances in this direction, that England will side with 
France. This support is of decisive importance and has materially 
contributed to the triumph of the war party” 

The assertion of Cambon, the French Ambassador in London, that 
“Germany had from the beginning rejected proposals that might have 
made for peace” [British White Book, No. 19], seems willful mis¬ 
representation. The facts themselves, as well as the documents, show 
Russia’s initial responsibility for throwing Europe into war, and sus¬ 
tain the German Chancellor’s twice expressed complaint that “his 
efforts to preach peace and moderation at Vienna have been seriously 
handicapped by the Russian mobilization” [British White Book, No. 
108 Cf. German White Book, No. 10 B]. Sazonov’s aggressiveness 
is transparent. His formula handed to the German Ambassador read¬ 
ing: “If Austria, recognizing that her conflict with Servia has as¬ 
sumed character of European interest,” etc. [British White Book, No. 
97], was a deliberate attempt to force a war of continental dimensions. 
Sir George Buchanan emphatically had told him that “direct British in¬ 
terests in Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would 
never be sanctioned by British public opinion.” [British White Book, 
No. 6.] 

On the day after the Emperor reached Berlin, July 27, he wired 
word to the Czar that while the principles at stake in the feud be- 
tween Austria and Servia required punishment of Servia, yet he was 
exerting all his influence to induce Austria-Hungary to come to an 
open and satisfactory understanding with Russia. In Sazonov’s own 
words, however, the Russian Imperial Cabinet had resolved “to put 
an end from this day forth to a misunderstanding which might arise 
regarding counsels of moderation” [Sazonov to Count Benckendorff 
July 28; British White Book, No. 53.] 

Through the Czar as its mouthpiece the Russian war party ex¬ 
pressed itself: 


— 10 — 


“A disgraceful war has been declared on a weak nation/’ wrote 
the Czar of all the Russias. ‘‘The indignation at this, which I fully 
share, is immense in Russia. I foresee that soon I can no longer with¬ 
stand the pressure and that I shall be forced to adopt measures which 
will lead to war.” 

The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs must have smiled ironic¬ 
ally at the bellicose tone of his master’s voice. To this heated 
declaration the Kaiser replied suggesting that “Russia remain in the 
role of a spectator toward the Austrian-Servian war,” and urged that 
“no military measures be taken by Russia which Austria-Hungary 
would think threatening.” 

This personal correspondence of the German Emperor has the 
unmistakable ring of sincerity in it and shows him struggling for time 
until Russia and Austria might come to agreement. Unfortunately 
Sazonov’s obdurate refusal “to exchange views” with Count Berchtold 
ruined the chance of peace. The pretension he expressed in favor 
of the British proposal for a conference [British White Book, No. 53], 
if his efforts at a “friendly exchange of views” with Austria failed 
[British White Book, No. 55] was sheer buncombe. Russia’s military 
ambition could not be stayed. She had begun mobilizing in advance of 
every other great power, although the Russian Minister of War, Su- 
chomlinow, on July 27, still declared to the German military attache on 
his word of honor [! ] that “no order to mobilize has as yet been issued 
.... no reserves were called, and no horses mustered.” [German 
White Book, No. 11.] 

Even Sir Edward Goschen, the British Ambassador in Berlin, 
was impressed with the “difficulty of Germany’s position in view of 
Russian mobilization and military measures.” [British White Book, 
No. 98.] This is the situation which coincides with Sir Edward 
Grey’s telegram to Sir Francis Bertie in Paris instructing him, when 
the twelfth hour was on the point of striking, to bring pressure through 
the French Minister of Foreign Affairs upon Russia not to precipitate 
a crisis. [British White Book, No. 104.] Sazonov’s defense of this 
aggressive course on Russia’s part, made to Sir George Buchanan, 
was that “absolute proof was in possession of the Russian Govern¬ 
ment that Germany was making military and naval preparations 
against Russia, more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Fin¬ 
land” [British White Book, No. 97], a statement for which not a 
scintilla of evidence was produced then or has been found later. 
Buchanan was evidently skeptical of Sazonov’s assertion, for even 
on the day following, Sazonov’s “absolute proof” is still intangibly 
described as merely “reason to believe.” [British White Book, No. 
113.] 

In these tense hours when Europe was living in heart-beats and 
not in figures on a dial the Kaiser brought every ounce of influence 
he could command to bear in favor of peace. But his every effort 
was thwarted by the military cabal ascendant in Petrograd, which 
controlled the will of the Czar. To the German Emperor’s earnest 
argument, made to Nicholas II. in person, on July 30, pointing out 
“the dangers and serious consequences of a mobilization” and showing 

— 11 — 


that his part of mediator was “threatened, if not made impossible” 
[German White Book, No. 23], the Czar replied twelve hours later 
saying that “the military measures now taking form were decided 
upon five days ago ”—a damning admission in the light of what the 
Russian Minister of War had said to the German military attache 
on July 27. The next day, July 31, in another telegram to the Kaiser 
the Czar pleaded as an excuse that it was “technically impossible to 
discontinue military preparations.” 

This latter dispatch crossed with one from the German Em¬ 
peror, sent the same day at 2 P. M. which has the poignancy of a 
great tragic utterance and will live in history as a state document 
of the first rank: 

“I have engaged in mediation between your government and 
the government of Austria-Hungary,” wrote the Kaiser. “While 
this action was taking place your troops were being mobilized. . . . 
My mediation has become almost illusory. In spite of this, I 
have continued it, and now I receive reliable news that serious 
preparations for war are going on on my eastern, frontier. The 
responsibility for the security of my country forces me to meas¬ 
ures of defence. I have gone to the extreme limit of the possible 
in my efforts for the preservation of the peace of the world. It 
is not I who bear the responsibility for the misfortune which now 
threatens the entire civilized world.” 

It were well for the reader clearly to perceive the actual, au¬ 
thentic diplomatic relations at this juncture, for since the war began 
the allied governments have deliberately tried to misrepresent the facts 
so as to exonerate Russia and to make it appear that Germany and 
Austria are wholly to blame. This construction is contained in what 
is misleadingly termed a “Dispatch from His Majesty’s ambassador 
at Vienna respecting the rupture of diplomatic relations with the 
Austro-Hungarian Government,” for it was not written from Vienna, 
but was prepared in London, after Sir Maurice de Bunsen had been 
given his passports, and is dated Sept. 1, 1914. Obviously is cannot 
be a dispatch.* It is clearly an inspired tract calculated to mislead 
and to deceive. In this pamphlet Sir Maurice de Bunsen twists the 
sequence of events in order to make it appear that Germany, on July 
31, through her “double ultimatums to St. Petersburg and Paris” 
violently shattered “the hopeful conversations” which had been going 
on between Vienna and St. Petersburg. The report reads: 

“M. Schebeko [the Russian Ambassador in Vienna], endeav¬ 
ored on the 28th of July to persuade the Austro-Hungarian Gov¬ 
ernment to furnish Count Szapary [the Austrian Ambassador in 
St. Petersburg] with full powers to continue at St. Petersburg 
the hopeful conversations which had there been taking place be¬ 
tween the latter and M. Sazonov. Count Berchtold refused at 
the time, but two days later [30th July], though in, the meantime 
Russia had partially mobilized against Austria, he received M. 

* This blunder has been “corrected” in the revised edition of the British 
White Book by leaving out the word “dispatch.” 

— 12 — 



Schebeko again, in a perfectly friendly manner, and gave his con¬ 
sent to the continuance of the conversations at St. Petersburg. 

.On the 1st August I was informed by M. Schebeko 

that Count Szapary had at last conceded the main point at issue 
by announcing to Mr. Sazonov that Austria would consent to sub¬ 
mit to meditation the points in the note to Servia which seemed 
incompatible with the maintenance of Servian independence. 

. . . . Unfortunately these conversations at St. Peters¬ 

burg and Vienna were cut short by the transfer of the dispute 
to the more dangerous ground of a direct conflict between Ger¬ 
many and Russia. Germany intervened on the 31st July by 
means of her double ultimatums to St. Petersburg and Paris. 

.A few days’ delay might in all probability have 

saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history.” 
[From Why We Are at War: Great Britain’s case. By members 
of the Oxford faculty of modern history, appendix v., pp, 211-12.] 

The misrepresentation, not to say mendacity of this statement is 
amazing. As an actual fact it was due to Germany that any negotia¬ 
tions obtained at all at this time in favor of peace. Sir Maurice de 
Bunsen adroitly passes over in silence the pacific course of the Kaiser. 
The very dates confute the truth of Bunsen’s assertions. He says 
that on July 30 Count Berchtold received M. Schebeko “in a perfectly 
friendly manner and gave his consent to the continuance of the con¬ 
versations at St. Petersburg.” Yet the day before this, July 29 , of¬ 
ficial orders had been issued for the mobilization of Russian troops 
in twenty-three military districts in the southern provinces —Odessa, 
Kieff, Moscow and Kazan [British White Book, Nos. 70, 76], and 
the day after , July 31 , Russia mobilized her entire army and fleet — 
in other words Russia mobilized against Germany as well as Austria. 
The statement of the German White Book that “accumulation of 
troops on the East Prussian frontier and the declaration of the state 
of war over all important parts of the Russian West frontier allowed 
no further doubt that the Russian mobilization was in full swing 
against us, while simultaneously all such measures were denied to our 
representative in St. Petersburg” is not a matter of partisan opinion, 
but is based on substantial facts which were beyond the control of the 
German Government. 

But to return to the action of Germany. It was only after the 
Emperor’s mediation had failed that the Imperial Government, on 
July 31, declared a state of war [Kriegsgefahr] as a counter measure, 
to be followed by mobilization if Russia did not cease moving her 
troops toward the German frontier within twelve hours. [See British 
White Book, No. 112: Goschen to Grey: “His Excellency added 
in explanation that ‘Kriegsgefahr’ signified the taking of certain pre¬ 
cautionary measures consequent upon strained relations with a for¬ 
eign country.”] Two hours after the expiration of the time-limit 
—significant delay in order to gain time for Russia’s military opera¬ 
tions, one thinks—Nicholas II. reiterated the specious statement, by 
wire, that the Russian “measures do not mean war,” and Sazonov 
said that Russia would “preserve her waiting attitude” [British White 

— 13 — 





Book, No. 132],—a “waiting attitude” with Russian mobilization under 
full pressure! The double dealing of Sazonov is now clearer than 
ever. His “conversations” had been a blind, for he knew that Russian 
mobilization was proceeding, and when asked by Germany for an 
assurance he simply failed to answer. 

Still the Kaiser waited and withheld his hand, though every duty 
of patriotism and the safety of Germany cried for haste. Again he 
wired the Czar adjuring him not to fling Europe into a holocaust. 
That telegram was never answered. The candle of peace was burned 
down into its socket. The great European and world war of Russia’s 
initial seeking and of Russia’s making began. Then—and then only, 
at 5 P. M. on August 1st, did Germany order the mobilization of her 
army and her fleet. 

The words of one of the most accomplished students of history 
in America, with a profound knowledge of the peoples involved and 
the issues at stake, one of rugged American ancestry for two hundred 
years back and who is without taint of suspicion of partisanship, may 
well be quoted here: 

“So far as the published dispatches and our imperfect knowl¬ 
edge of the circumstances go, it is proved that Emperor William 
would have held his hand for a few days if Russian mobilization 
had not seemed a warlike act directed against Germany.” [Albert 
Bushnell Hart: The War in Europe, pp. 137-38.] 

It is hard to come to any other conclusion than that Russia pro¬ 
voked the war. It is, therefore, interesting to look into the internal 
condition of Russia for the reasons which prompted her government 
to this act. First to consider are the position of the Russian aristoc¬ 
racy and the military class. 

Russia’s military class still tingled with the shame of defeat in 
the Russo-Japanese War and was eager to rehabilitate its damaged 
reputation. The autocracy was angry at the growth of liberal, popular 
ideas in Russia, and looked upon the program of the constitutionalists 
with dismay. Accordingly both these classes wanted war as the 
readiest and most effective means to restore their power. Recourse 
to war under such circumstances is an old trick. History affords 
many examples of the practice. Liberal Russia had also its axe to 
grind. Chafing at the slow growth of their cause, impatient of the 
vexatious restraints imposed upon the desire for free political institu¬ 
tions and tired of delusive and delayed promises the Russian liberals 
espoused the war as a desperate expedient. They calculate that if 
the war be successful popular support of it will have to be recognized 
in substantial enlargement of popular liberty. On the other hand, if 
the war be disastrous to Russia they count upon the downfall of 
the autocracy and the military class, and that thus the ground will be 
cleared for the erection of a national, liberal government. 

The incongruity of the alliance of the opposing elements in Russia 
today recalls the situation in the French Revolution early in 1792, 
when the Constitutional Monarchists and the Republican Girondists,, 
though hostile to one another, co-operated to force war upon Austria 

— 14 — 


on April 20, 1792. Both parties were then gambling with the fates 
as both parties are in Russia now. The Monarchists argued: If the 
war is successful it will strengthen the throne; if the war goes disas¬ 
trously all France will have to rally around the king in order to save 
the country. Therefore, the crown in either event will profit. On 
the other hand the Republicans argued: If the war against Austria 
is successful we, as advocates of the war policy, will be able to dictate 
a republican form of government to France; if the war is unsuccess¬ 
ful it will destroy the French monarchy and on its ruins a republic will 
arise. The issue of such desperate politics was the Reign of Terror. 

Russia has also had another motive in promoting war. There 
is strong evidence that Russia in the Spring and early Summer of this 
year was upon the verge of revolutionary outbreak which the war has 
averted. An English writer in the November number of the Con¬ 
temporary Review, who signs himself with the pseudonym “Anglit- 
chanin,” but who is known to be a former officer in the Indian service 
and now attached to the British embassy in Petrograd [and an Eng¬ 
lishman in such position can hardly be suspected, of darkening the 
picture], has described how upon his arrival in St. Petersburg: 

“One hundred and twenty thousand workmen were on strike, 
and [this is the point] they were not on strike for higher wages. 
In no single case did the men make a demand from their masters. 
In no single case had a man gone on strike because of a visible 
grievance which his master could put right. No concession by 
the masters could have brought the men back to work. The only 
answer they returned, when asked why there was a strike, was 
that they were dissatisfied with their lives, with the present con¬ 
ditions of the workingmen, and that they intended to disorganize 

the state until these conditions are altered. 

“Things seemed to the Russian Government about as bad as 
they very well could be, and orders were actually given for the 
severest possible repressive measures, which would perhaps have 
involved a large-scale battle, probably a massacre, certainly a 
state of war.” 

War externally waged saved Russia from war within. She is 
making Germany and Austria—and France—pay the price in blood 
and treasure of her own incompetence and her own sins to her own 
people. 

History never repeats itself. But there are often striking analogies 
in history. 

“Was man nicht weiss, das eben brauchte man,” 
wrote Goethe. Russia is playing with dangerous, intangible and in¬ 
calculable forces in her own midst, which she does not understand, 
as France did in 1792, and these may yet turn and rend her as France 
was rent by the Terror. She has chosen the desperate course of vio¬ 
lating the peace of the world and beginning a war which staggers hu¬ 
manity because she has shrunk from facing the results of her own 
stupidity and incapacity to govern. 

This is not an extravagant, disordered view of Russia’s present 

— 15 — 



internal condition. The recent open letter of the leader of the Social- 
Democratic Party in Russia to M. Vandervelde, chief of the Belgian 
Social Democracy, shows the real spirit of popular Russia. Speaking 
of Russian absolutism he says: 

“This absolutism remains unchanged as far as the domestic 
policy of Russia is concerned. Everywhere throughout the Em¬ 
pire there reigns the old merciless oppression, the same boundless 
practice of exploiting the people. Even during the present war, 
when it might have been expected that absolutism would proceed 
more cautiously, and show some generosity, it has remained true 
to its nature. Arrests, banishment without trial, and remorseless 
persecution are still the order of the day. The same pressure is 
being exercised on Democracy, on the various nationalities of 
Russia, and, above all, on the laboring classes. All Socialist papers 
have been suppressed, all workingmen’s organizations dissolved. 
Should the war end in a complete victory of the reactionary Gov¬ 
ernment in Russia, without a simultaneous democratization of 
the political power, the rulers would continue, after the conclusion 
of peace, both within and without the boundaries of the Empire, 
the old policy, so hostile to the best interests of the people. 

“For these reasons, the Russian proletariat can in no case and 
under no circumstances conclude even a brief truce with the Rus¬ 
sian Government, and must refuse to support it in any manner. 
There can be no thought of violating our loyalty to our ideals. On 
the contrary, it is our bounden duty to continue our warfare 
against the Russian Government, as waged, with such perfect 
unanimity, during the revolutionary movement of 1905, and as 
manifested during the agitations of two years ago.” 


LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



0 018 989 244 5 


4 


— 16 — 
































